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Abstract
Dierential privacy oers a formal framework for reasoning about
privacy and accuracy of computations on private data. It also oers a
rich set of building blocks for constructing private data analyses. When
carefully calibrated, these analyses simultaneously guarantee the pri-
vacy of the individuals contributing their data, and the accuracy of the
data analyses results, inferring useful properties about the population.
The compositional nature of dierential privacy has motivated the de-
sign and implementation of several programming languages aimed at
helping a data analyst in programming dierentially private analyses.
However, most of the programming languages for dierential privacy
proposed so far provide support for reasoning about privacy but not for
reasoning about the accuracy of data analyses. To overcome this limi-
tation, in this work we present DPella, a programming framework pro-
viding data analysts with support for reasoning about privacy, accuracy
and their trade-os. The distinguishing feature of DPella is a novel com-
ponent which statically tracks the accuracy of dierent data analyses. In
order to make tighter accuracy estimations, this component leverages
taint analysis for automatically inferring statistical independence of the
dierent noise quantities added for guaranteeing privacy. We evaluate
our approach by implementing several classical queries from the litera-
ture and showing how data analysts can gure out the best manner to
calibrate privacy to meet the accuracy requirements.
Keywords: accuracy, concentration bounds, dierential privacy, func-
tional programming, databases, haskell
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Introduction
Motivation
Dierential privacy (DP) [17] is emerging as a viable solution to release
statistical information about the population without compromising data
subjects’ privacy. A standard way to achieve DP is adding some statistical
noise to the result of a data analysis. If the noise is carefully calibrated, it
provides a privacy protection for the individuals contributing their data,
and at the same time it enables the inference of accurate information
about the population from which the data are drawn. Thanks to its
quantitative formulation quantifying privacy by means of the parameters
 and δ, DP provides a mathematical framework for rigorously reasoning
about the privacy-accuracy trade-os. The accuracy requirement is not
baked in the denition of DP, rather it is a constraint that is made explicit
for a specic task at hand when a dierentially private data analysis is
designed.
An important property of DP is composeability: multiple dieren-
tially private data analyses can be composed with a graceful degradation
of the privacy parameters  and δ. This property allows to reason about
privacy as a budget: a data analyst can decide how much privacy budget
(the  parameter) to assign to each of her analyses. The compositional-
ity aspects of DP motivated the design of several programming frame-
works [38, 49, 48, 25, 21, 4, 5, 61, 58, 31, 60, 62] and tools [36, 42, 39, 23]
with built-in basic data analyses to help analysts to design their own dif-
ferentially private consults. At a high level, most of these programming
frameworks and tools are based on a similar idea for reasoning about
privacy: use some primitives for basic tasks in DP as building blocks,
and use composition properties to combine these building blocks mak-
ing sure that the privacy cost of each data analysis sum up and that the
total cost does not exceed the privacy budget. Programming frameworks
such as [38, 49, 48, 25, 21, 4, 5, 61, 58, 31, 60, 62] also provide general sup-
port to further combine, through programming techniques, the dierent
building blocks and the results of the dierent data analyses. Dierently,
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tools such as [36, 42, 39, 23] are optimized for specic tasks at the price
of restricting the kinds of data analyses they can support.
Unfortunately, this simple approach for privacy cannot be directly
applied to accuracy. Reasoning about accuracy is less compositional than
reasoning about privacy, and it depends both on the specic task at hand
and on the specic accuracy measure that one is interested in oering
to data analysts. Despite this, when restricted to specic mechanisms
and specic forms of data analyses, one can measure accuracy through
estimates given as condence intervals, or error bounds. As an example,
most of the standard mechanisms from the dierential privacy literature
come with theoretical condence intervals or error bounds that can
be exposed to data analysts in order to allow them to take informed
decisions about the consults they want to run. This approach has been
integrated in tools such as GUPT [42], PSI [23], and Apex [24]. Users
of these tools, can specify the target condence interval they want to
achieve, and the tools adjust accordingly the privacy parameters, when
sucient budget is available1.
In contrast, all the programming frameworks proposed so far [38, 49,
48, 25, 21, 4, 5, 61, 58, 31, 60, 62] do not oer any support to programmers
or data analysts for tracking, and reasoning about, the accuracy of their
data analyses. This phenomenon is in large part due to the complex
nature of accuracy reasoning, with respect to privacy analyses, when
designing arbitrary data analyses that users of these frameworks may
want to program and run. In this work, we address this limitation by
building a programming framework for designing dierentially private
analysis which also supports a compositional form of reasoning about
accuracy.
Background
We start by providing a brief background on the notions of privacy and
accuracy DPella considers. Dierential privacy [17] is a quantitative
notion of privacy that bounds how much a single individual’s private
data can aect the result of a data analysis. More formally, we can
1Apex actually goes beyond this by also helping user by selecting the right dieren-
tially private mechanism to achieve the required accuracy.
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dene dierential privacy as a property of a randomized query Q˜(·)
representing the data analysis, as follow.
Denition 1. Dierential Privacy (DP)[17] A randomized query
Q˜(·) : db→ R satises -dierential privacy if and only if for any two
datasets D1 and D2 in db, which dier in one row, and for every output
set S ⊆ R we have
Pr[Q˜(D1) ∈ S] 6 e Pr[Q˜(D2) ∈ S] (1)
In the denition above, the parameter  determines a bound on the
distance between the distributions induced by Q˜(·) when adding or
removing an individual from the dataset—the farther away they are,
the more at risk the privacy of an individual is, and vice versa. In other
words,  imposes a limit on the privacy loss that an individual can incur
in, as a result of running a data analysis.
A standard way to achieve -dierential privacy is adding some
carefully calibrated noise to the result of a query. To protect all the
dierent ways in which an individual’s data can aect the result of a
query, the noise needs to be calibrated to the maximal change that the
result of the query can have when changing an individual’s data. This is
formalized through the notion of sensitivity.
Denition 2. [17] The (global) sensitivity of a query Q(·) : db→ R is
the quantity ∆Q = max{|Q(D1)−Q(D2)| for D1, D2 diering in one
row
The sensitivity gives a measure of the amount of noise needed to
protect one individual’s data. Besides, in order to achieve dierential
privacy, it is also important the choice of the kind of noise that one adds.
A standard approach is based on the addition of noise sampled from the
Laplace distribution.
Theorem 1. Laplace Mechanism [17] Let Q(·) : db → R be a de-
terministic query with sensitivity ∆Q. Let Q˜(·) : db→ R be a random-
ized query dened as Q˜(D) = Q(D) + η, where η is sample from the
Laplace distribution with mean µ = 0 and scale b = ∆Q/. Then Q˜ is
-dierentially private.
Notice that in the theorem above, for a given query, the smaller the
 is, the more noise Q˜(·) needs to inject in order to hide the contribution
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of one individual’s data to the result—this protects privacy but degrades
how meaningful the result of the query is—and vice versa. In general,
the notion of accuracy can be dened more formally as follows.
Denition 3. Accuracy, see e.g.[15] Given an -dierentiallly private
query Q˜(·), a target query Q(·), a distance function d(·), a bound α, and
the probability β, we say that Q˜(·) is (d(·), α, β)-accurate with respect to
Q(·) if and only if for all dataset D:
Pr[d(Q˜(D)−Q(D)) > α] 6 β (2)
This denition allows one to express data independent error state-
ments such as: with probability at least 1− β the query Q˜(D) diverge
from Q(D), in terms of the distance d(·), for less than α. Then, we will
refer to α as the error and 1− β as the condence probability or simply
condence. In general, the lower the β is, i.e., the higher the condence
probability is, the higher the error α is.
As previously discussed, an important property of dierential privacy
is composeability.
Theorem2. Sequential Composition [17] Let Q˜1(·) and Q˜2(·) be two
queries which are 1- and 2-dierentially private, respectively. Then, their
sequential composition Q˜(·) = (Q˜1(·), Q˜2(·)) is (1 + 2)-dierentially
private.
Theorem 3. Parallel Composition [38] Let Q˜(·) be a -dierentially
private query. and data1,data2 be a partition of the set of data. Then,
the query Q˜1(D) = (Q˜(D ∩ data1), Q˜(D ∩ data2)) is -dierentially
private. Thanks to the composition properties of dierential privacy, we
can think about  as a privacy budget that one can spend on a given data
before compromising the privacy of individuals’ contributions to that
data. The global  for a given program can be seen as the privacy budget
for the entire data. This budget can be consumed by selecting the local  to
“spend” in each intermediate query. Thanks to the composition properties,
by tracking the local  that are consumed, one can guarantee that a data
analysis will not consume more than the allocated privacy budget.
Given an , DPella gives data analysts the possibility to explore how
to spend it on dierent queries and analyze the impact on accuracy. For
instance, data analysts might decide to spend “more” epsilon on sub-
queries which results are required to be more accurate, while spending
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“less” on the others. The next examples (inspired by the use of DP in
network trace analyses [37]) show how DPella helps to quantify what
“more” and “less” means.
Contribution
The main contribution of this thesis is showing how programming frame-
works can internalize the use of probabilistic bounds [14] for compos-
ing dierent condence intervals or error bounds, in an automated way.
Probabilistic bounds are part of the classical toolbox for the analysis of
randomized algorithms, and are the tools that dierential privacy algo-
rithms designers usually employ for the accuracy analysis of classical
mechanisms [15, 18]. Two important probabilistic bounds are the union
bound, that can be used to compose errors with no assumption on the way
the random noise is generated, and Cherno bound, which applies to the
sum of random noise when the dierent random variables characterizing
noise generation are statistically independent (see Section 3). When appli-
cable, and when the number of random variables grows, Cherno bound
usually gives a much “tighter” error estimation than the union bound.
Barthe et. al [8] have shown how the union bound can be internal-
ized in a Hoare-style logic for reasoning about probabilistic imperative
programs, and how this logic can be used to reason in a mechanized
way about the accuracy of probabilistic programs, and in particular of
programs implementing dierentially private primitives.
Building on this idea, this thesis proposes a programming framework
where this kind of reasoning is automated, and can be combined with
reasoning about privacy. The aim of such framework is to oer program-
mers the tools that they need for implementing dierentially private
data analyses and explore their privacy-accuracy trade-os, in a composi-
tional way. This framework supports not only the use of union bound as
a reasoning principle, but also the use of the Cherno bound. The insight
is that probabilistic bounds relying on probabilistic independence of ran-
dom variables can be smoothly integrated in a programming framework
by using techniques from information-ow control [52] (in the form of
taint analysis [53]). While these probabilistic bounds are not enough to
express every accuracy guarantee one wants to express for arbitrary data
analyses, they allow the analysis of a large class of user-designed pro-
grams. The approach to be presented in this thesis allows programmers
to exploit the compositional nature of both privacy and utility, comple-
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menting in this way the support provided by tools such as GUPT [42],
PSI [23], which yield condence intervals estimate only at the level of in-
dividual queries, and by Apex [24], which issue condence intervals esti-
mate only at the level of a query workload for queries of the same type.
The described tool is materialized as a programming framework
called DPella —an acronym for Dierential Privacy in Haskell with
accuracy— where data analysts can explore the privacy-accuracy trade-
o while writing their dierentially private data analyses. DPella pro-
vides several basic dierentially private building blocks and composition
techniques, which can be used by a programmer to design complex dif-
ferentially private data analyses. The analyses that can be expressed in
DPella are data independent and can be built using primitives for count-
ing, average, max as well as any aggregation of their results.
DPella supports both pure-DP, with parameter , and approximate-
DP, with parameters  and δ. Accordingly, it supports the use of both
Laplace and Gaussian noise, and the use of sequential or advanced [15]
composition, respectively, together with parallel composition for both
notions. For clarity, this thesis will mainly focus on -DP and will present
the use of the Laplace mechanism, however other variants will be dis-
cussed briey (see Section 3.3). DPella is implemented as a library in the
general purpose language Haskell; a programming language that is well-
known to easily support information-ow analyses [34, 50]. Further-
more, DPella is designed to be extensible through the addition of new
primitives (see Section 6).
To reason about privacy and accuracy, DPella provides two primi-
tives responsible to symbolically interpret programs (which implement
data analyses). DPella’s symbolic interpretation for privacy consists on
decreasing the privacy budget of a query by deducing the required bud-
get of its sub-parts. On the other hand, the accuracy interpretation uses
as abstraction the inverse Cumulative Distribution Function (iCDF) rep-
resenting an upper bound on the (theoretical) error that the program
incurs when guaranteeing DP. The iCDF of a query is build out of the
iCDFs of the dierent components, by using as a basic composition prin-
ciple the union bound. These interpretations provide overestimates of
the corresponding quantities that they track. In order to make these esti-
mates as precise as possible, DPella uses taint analysis to track the use
of noise to identify which variables are statistically independent. This in-
formation is used by DPella to soundly replace, when needed, the union
bound with the Cherno bound, something that to the best of our knowl-
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edge other program logics or program analyses also focusing on accu-
racy, such as [8] and [54], do not consider. We envision DPella’s accu-
racy estimations to be used in scenarios which align with those consid-
ered by tools like GUPT, PSI, and Apex.
In summary, this thesis contributions are:
I Present DPella, a programming framework that allows data analysts
to reason compositionaly about privacy-accuracy trade-o.
I Show how to use taint analysis to detect statistical independence of
the noise that dierent primitives add, and how to use this information
to achieve better error estimates.
I Inspect DPella’s expressiveness and error estimations by implement-
ing PINQ-like queries from previous work [37, 38, 3] and workloads
from the matrix mechanism [33, 28, 59].
Thesis structure
This thesis is an extended version of the work “A Programming Frame-
work for Dierential Privacy with Accuracy Concentration Bounds” to
be published in The 41st IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P
2020), San Francisco, USA, May 2020. The referred paper was created in
collaboration with Alejandro Russo and Marco Gaboardi.
This document is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces DPella
by showcasing its main features though simple examples. Section 2
presents each of DPella’s primitives for the construction and execution of
queries. Section 3 explains how do we calculate accuracy concentration
bounds and the accuracy-aware primitives that can be used by the data
analysts. On Section 4 we implement case studies from the literature
revealing DPella’s advantages and limitations. Section 5 introduces a new
primitive that allows data analysts to test DPella’s accuracy estimations.
Following, on Section 6 we discuss DPella’s limitations in detail together
with possible extensions to the framework. Lastly, Section 7 puts DPella
in context while contrasting it with other approaches and frameworks.
This work was initiated by a STINT Initiation grant (IB 2017-77023)
and supported by the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research (SSF)
under the project Octopi (Ref. RIT17-0023) and WebSec (Ref. RIT17-0011)
as well as the Swedish research agency Vetenskapsrådet.
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1
DPella by example
DPella’s model considers two kind of actors: data curators, owners
of the private dataset that decide the global privacy budget and split
it among the data analysts, the ones who write queries to mine useful
information from the data and spend the budget they received. Analysts
are not allowed to directly query the database, instead, they need to
implement their analyses and send them to the curator which will execute
them and give the results back.
project
SchemaDB.hs
analysts
Queries.hs
curator
Execution.hs
dataset.csv
Figure 1: File structure
From an implementation standpoint, it
means that the analyses and their run func-
tions are provided in dierent les, with dif-
ferent privileges. More specically, Figure 1
depicts a common le structure for the us-
age of DPella. File SchemaDB.hs contains
the schema of the database own by the cu-
rator, it does not contain private data, only
the names of the tables and their respective
attributes as a Haskell record type. For ex-
ample, a database containing just one table
called Ages with two attributes name (a String value) and age (an Int
value), will be encoded in SchemaDB.hs as follows, where (::) is used to
describe the type of a term in Haskell:
data Ages = AgeRow {name :: String, age :: Int}
Since the structure of the database is not considered sensitive informa-
tion, SchemaDB.hs can be accessed by both, the data owners and data
analysts.
File Queries.hs contains the analyses that have being implemented
by the data analysts, all of these queries should be parameterized by
the dataset in which they will be later executed. Analysts will only
9
1. DPella by example
have access to their implementations and the database schema. Lastly,
le Execution.hs implements the run functions for the analyses at
Queries.hs, this le is own by the curator and has access to all other
les in the directory, in particular, it has access to the real data—stored
in dataset.csv.
1.1 Basic aggregations
For the following examples, we consider a dataset representing a tcpdump
trace of packets where each row contains the information indicated by
its schema:
data Tcpdump = TCPRow {id :: Integer
, timestamp :: Double
, src :: IP
, dest :: IP
, protocol :: Integer
, size :: Integer
, payload :: ByteString
}
1.1.1 Counting
An analyst wanting to know the number of packets sent to WikiLeaks,
with IP address 195.35.109.53, can do so by writing a simple eps-
dierentially private query as follows:
import SchemaDB
import AnalystLP
−
wikileaks :: → Data 1 Tcpdump→ Query (Value Double)
wikileaks eps dataset = do
byIP← dpWhere ((≡ 195.35.109.53) ◦ dest) dataset
dpCount eps byIP
First, we import le SchemaDB where Tcpdump’s description (previ-
ously presented) is stored. Then, we import DPella’s interface for ana-
lysts called AnalystLP, where LP indicates that we will use the Lapla-
cian mechanism. Subsequently, we implement query wikileaks which
10
1.1. Basic aggregations
takes as input the amount of privacy budget eps (of type ) to be spent
by the query and the dataset (of type Data 1 Tcpdump) where it
will be computed; when executed, this query will yield results of type
Query (Value Double), that is, DPella computations of type Double—a
more detailed explanation of DPella’s types could be found in the follow-
ing sections. In query wikileaks, we use the primitive transformation2
dpWhere to lter all rows whose dest attribute has a value equal to
195.35.109.53, this operation returns a transformed dataset that we
have called byIP. We proceed to perform the noisy count using primi-
tive dpCount over the ltered dataset byIP while spending eps amount
of privacy budget. The value of eps will—internally—determine the mag-
nitude of noise to be added to the real count.
Having this general implementation, an analyst can write specic
queries xing the value of eps, for instance:
analysis1 = wikileaks 0.5
analysis2 = wikileaks 1
analysis3 = wikileaks 5
To execute these analyses the data owner needs to implement a
function that loads the required dataset and execute analysts’ queries,
such a function will look like:
import SchemaDB
import CuratorLP (loadDS, dpEval)
import Queries
−
runAnalysis :: (Data 1 Tcpdump→ Query (Value Double))
→ → IO Double
runAnalysis query bud = do
ds← loadDS "hotspot.csv"
dpEval query ds bud
Function runAnalysis takes as inputs the function to be executed, called
query, and the global privacy budget bud; returning the randomized
count as an IO Double. This function calls an auxiliar function loadDS
(provided by DPella’s interface for curators) to read le hotspot.csv
2Anticipating on Section 2, in our code we will usually use the red color for trans-
formations, the blue color for aggregate operations, and the green color for combinators
for privacy and accuracy.
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which is then saved as a DPella’s dataset in variable ds. Next, it uses
DPella’s primitive dpEval indicating which analysis will be perform,
over which dataset, and what’s the tolerance for the privacy loss.
Let’s assume hotspot.csv have the information of 10, 000 packets
and 7 of them where directed to wikileaks’ IP address. Then, when the
data owner executes the analysis she would get results such as:
>runAnalisis analysis1 20
Value = 15.3
>runAnalisis analysis2 20
Value = 4.8
>runAnalisis analysis3 20
Value = 6.7
Which clearly exemplies the eects of the selection of eps on the
queries’ results. Intuitively, the greater the eps, the closer we are to the
real count of packets.
1.1.2 Sums
Suppose we are now interested in computing the amount of transmit-
ted data. This is, we want to sum up the value of size column which
indicates the length of the packets in bytes.
In DPella, to compute a sum, we need to determine rst the range of
the values—our framework supports only natural numbers’ ranges, e.g.,
[1, 10], [5, 10], etc. This information is needed to automatically calculate
the sensitivity of sum queries at compile time, i.e., if every value is in the
range [a, b], the sensitivity is b− a. The way to specify ranges in DPella
is via the primitive range.
range :: (Nat a, Nat b, Nat (b-a), a 6 b)⇒ Range a b
This function receives no arguments since the range is indicated
at the type-level (with type constraints of the form Nat n). To create
ranges, we need to use type applications, e.g.,
range1 = range @1 @10
range2 = range @5 @10
For our specic case, the data curator indicates that the range of the
size of packets go from 40 to 35, 000 bytes, then we dene our query as
follows:
12
1.2. Cumulative Distribution Function
totalBytes eps dataset = do
dpSum eps (range @40 @35000) size dataset
Function totalBytes uses primitive dpSum to compute the noisy sum
of size attribute—whose values are ranging from 40 to 35000 bytes—
over the indicated dataset. The way this query should be executed
does not vary from the execution of the analyses derived from function
wikileaks, thus is omitted.
Changing the question to focus on an specic protocol might require
an adjustment on the range to be specied. For instance, if instead we
want to inspect the total amount of data transmitted through Kerberos’
authentication protocol, which uses port 88, we should use the fact that
this port transmits packets of at most of 1465 bytes. Hence, we will need
to update our query accordingly
totalBytesKerberos eps dataset = do
kerberos← dpWhere ((≡ 88) ◦ protocol) dataset
dpSum eps (range @40 @1465) size kerberos
In function totalBytesKerberoswe will rst lter the dataset to obtain
the information regarding port 88, then we perform the noisy sum over
the ltered data. Observe that we are dening a query with less global
sensitivity than the one implemented in function totalBytes, thus, if
given the same eps, less noise will be added to the results of the analyses
deriving from function totalBytesKerberos.
Having a notion of the order of magnitude in which the result of a
sum ranges becomes handy when reasoning about the accuracy of the
query.
In the following examples we depict how an analyst can use DPella
to inspect the error of her queries, check out for miscalculations on the
consumption of the privacy budget, and more.
1.2 Cumulative Distribution Function
Considering the same dataset Tcpdump we would like to inspect—in a
dierentially private manner—the packet’s length distribution by com-
puting its Cumulative Distribution function (CDF), dened as CDF(x) =
number of records with value 6 x. Hence, we are just interested in the
values of the attribute size.
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1 cdf1 bins eps dataset = do
2 sizes ← dpSelect size dataset
3 counts← sequence [ do elems← dpWhere (6 bin) sizes
4 dpCount localEps elems
5 | bin← bins]
6 return (norm∞ counts)
7 where localEps = eps / (length bins)
(a) Sequential approach
8 cdf2 bins eps dataset = do
9 sizes← dpSelect ((6 max bins) ◦ size) dataset
10 -- parts :: Map Integer (Value Double)
11 parts← dpPartRepeat (dpCount eps) bins assignBin
12 sizes
13 let counts = Map.elems parts
14 cumulCounts = [ add (take i counts)
15 | i← [1.length counts ] ]
16 return (norm∞ cumulCounts)
(b) Parallel approach
Figure 2: CDF’s implementations
McSherry and Mahajan [37] proposed three dierent ways to ap-
proximate (due to the injected noise) CDFs with DP, and they argued for
their dierent levels of accuracy. For simplicity, we revise two of these
approximations to show how DPella can assist in showing the accuracy
of these analyses.
1.2.1 Sequential CDF
A simple approach to compute the CDF consists in splitting the range
of lengths into bins and, for each bin, count the number of records
that are 6 bin. A natural way to make this computation dierentially
private is to add independent Laplace noise to each count.
We show how to do this using DPella in Figure 2a. We dene a
function cdf1 which takes as input the list of bins describing size
ranges, the amount of budget eps to be spent by the entire query, and
the dataset where it will be computed. For now, we assume that we
have a xed list of bins for packets’ length. cdf1 uses the primitive
transformation dpSelect to obtain from the dataset the length of each
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packet via a selector function, in this case it is just the column of interest
size. This computation results in a new dataset sizes. Then, we create
a counting query for each bin using the primitive dpWhere. This lters
all records that are less than the bin under consideration (6 bin). Finally,
we perform a noisy count using primitive dpCount. The noise injected
by the primitive dpCount is calibrated so that the execution of dpCount
is localEps-DP (line 7 3). The function sequence then takes the list of
queries and compute them sequentially collecting their results in a list—
to create a list of noisy counts. We then return this list. The combinator
norm∞ in line 6 is used to mark where we want the accuracy information
to be collected, but it does not have any impact on the actual result of
the cdf.
To ensure that cdf1 is eps-dierential privacy, we distributed the
given budget eps evenly among the sub-queries (this is done in lines 4
and 7). However, a data analyst may forget to do so, e.g., she can dene
localEps = eps, and in this case the nal query is (length bins)*eps-
DP, which is a signicant change in the query’s privacy price. To pre-
vent such budget miscalculations or unintended expenditure of privacy
budget, DPella provides the analyst with the function budget (see Sec-
tion 2) that, given a query, statically computes an upper bound on how
much budget it will spend. To see how to use this function, consider the
function cdf1 and a its modied version cdf1’ with localEps = eps.
Suppose that we want to compute how much budget will be consumed
by running it on a list of bins of size 10 (identied as bins10) and a sym-
bolic dataset symDataset. Then, the data analyst can ask this as follows:
>budget (cdf1 bins10 1 symDataset)
 = 1
>budget (cdf1’ bins10 1 symDataset)
 = 10
The function budget will not execute the query, it simply performs an
static analysis on the code of the query by symbolically interpreting it.
The static analysis uses information encoded by the type of symDataset
(explained in Section 2), that, in this particular case, will be provided by
Tcpdump’s schema.
DPella also provides primitives to statically explore the accuracy of a
query. The function accuracy takes a noisy query Q˜(·) and a probability
3The casting operation fromIntegral is omitted for clarity
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β and returns an estimate of the (theoretical) error that can be achieved
with condence probability 1− β. Suppose that we want to estimate the
error we will incur in by running cdf1 with a budget of  = 1 with the
same list of bins and symbolic dataset as above, and we want to have this
estimate for β = 0.05 and β = 0.2, respectively. Then, the data analyst
can ask this as follow:
>accuracy (cdf1 bins10 1 symDataset) 0.05
α = 53
>accuracy (cdf1 bins10 1 symDataset) 0.2
α = 40
Since the result of the query is a vector of counts, we measure the
error α in terms of `∞ distance with respect to the CDF without noise.
This is the max dierence that we can have in a bin due to the noise. The
way to read the information provided by DPella is that with condence
95% and 80%, we have errors 53 and 40, respectively. These error bounds
can be used by a data analyst to gure out the exact set of parameters
that would be useful for her task.
1.2.2 Parallel CDF
Another way to compute a CDF is by rst generating an histogram of the
data according to the bins, and then building a cumulative sum for each
bin. To make this function private, an approach could be to add noise at
the dierent bins of the histogram, rather than to the cumulative sums
themselves, so that we could use the parallel composition, rather than
the sequential one [37], which we show how to implement in DPella
in Figure 2b. —where double-dashes are used to introduce single-line
comments.
In cdf2, we rst select all the packages whose length is smaller than
the maximum bin, and then we partition the data accordingly to the given
list of bins. To do this, we use dpPartRepeat operator to create as many
(disjoint) datasets as given bins, where each record in each partition be-
longs to the range determined by an specic bin—where the record be-
longs is determined by the function assignBin :: Integer→ Integer.
After creating all partitions, the primitive dpPartRepeat computes the
given query dpCount eps in each partition—the name dpPartRepeat
comes from repetitively calling dpCount eps as many times as parti-
tions we have. As a result, dpPartRepeat returns a nite map where
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the keys are the bins and the elements are the noisy count of the records
per partition—i.e., the histogram. In what follows (lines 14–16), we com-
pute the cumulative sums of the noisy counts using the DPella primitive
add, and nally we build and return the list of values denoting the CDF.
The privacy analysis of cdf2 is similar to the one of cdf1. The ac-
curacy analysis, however, is more interesting: rst it gets error bounds
for each cumulative sum, then these are used to give an error bound on
the maximum error of the vector. For the error bounds on the cumula-
tive sums DPella uses either the union bound or the Cherno bound,
depending on which one gives the lowest error. For the maximum error
of the vector, DPella uses the union bound, similarly to what happens in
cdf1. A data analyst can explore the accuracy of cdf2.
>accuracy (cdf2 bins10 1 symDataset) 0.05
α = 22
>accuracy (cdf2 bins10 1 symDataset) 0.2
α = 20
1.2.3 Exploring the privacy-accuracy trade-o
Let us assume that a data analyst is interested in running a CDF with
an error bounded with 90% condence, i.e., with β = 0.1, having three
bins (named bins3), and  = 1. With those assumptions in mind, which
implementation should she use? To answer that question, the data analyst
can ask DPella:
>accuracy (cdf1 bins3 1 symDataset) 0.1
α = 11
>accuracy (cdf2 bins3 1 symDataset) 0.1
α = 12
So, the analyst would know that using cdf1 in this case would give,
likely, a lower error. Suppose further that the data analyst realize that
she prefers to have a ner granularity and have 10 bins, instead of only
3. Which implementation should she use? Again, she can compute:
>accuracy (cdf1 bins10 1 symDataset) 0.1
α = 46
>accuracy (cdf2 bins10 1 symDataset) 0.1
α = 20
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Figure 3: Error comparison (95% condence)
So, the data analyst would know that using cdf2 in this case would
give, likely, a lower error. One can also use DPella to show a comparison
between cdf1 and cdf2 in terms of error when we keep the privacy
parameter xed and we change the number of bins, where cdf2 gives
a better error when the number of bins is large [37] as illustrated in
Figure 3. In the gure, we also show the empirical error to conrm that
our estimate is tight—the oscillations on the empirical cdf1 are given
by the relative small (300) number of experimental runs we consider.
Now, what if the data analyst choose to use cdf2 because of what
we discussed before but she realizes that she can aord an error α 6 50;
what would be then the epsilon that gives such α? One of the feature
of DPella is that the analyst can write a simple program that nds it by
repetitively calling accuracy with dierent epsilons—this is one of the
advantages of providing a programming framework. These dierent use
cases shows the exibility of DPella for dierent tasks in private data
analyses.
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DPella is designed to help data analysts to have an informed deci-
sion about how to spend their budget based on exploring the trade-os
between privacy and accuracy. In this section, we introduce DPella’s
primitives and design principles responsible to ensure dierential pri-
vacy of queries written by data analysts.
2.1 Components of the API
Figure 4 shows part of DPella API. DPella introduces two abstract data
types to respectively denote datasets and queries:
data Data s r -- datasets
data Query a -- queries
The attentive reader might have observed that the API also introduces
the data type Value a. This type is used to capture values resulting
from data aggregations. However, we defer its explanation for Section 3
since it is only used for accuracy calculations—for this section, readers
can consider the type Value a as isomorphic to the type a. It is also
worth noticing that the API enforces an invariant by construction: it is
not possible to branch on results produced by aggregations—observe that
there is no primitive capable to destruct a value of type Value a. While
it might seem restrictive, it enables to write counting queries, which are
the bread and butter of statistical analysis and have been the focus of
the majority of the work in DP. Section 6 discusses, however, how to lift
this limitation for specic analyses.
Values of type Data s r represent sensitive datasets with accumu-
lated stability s, where each row is of type r. Accumulated stability, on
the other hand, is instantiated to type-level positive natural numbers,
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-- Transformations (data analyst)
dpWhere :: (r→ Bool)→ Data s r→ Query (Data s r)
dpGroupBy :: Eq k⇒ (r→ k)→ Data s r
→ Query (Data (2*s) (k, [r ]))
dpIntersect :: Eq r ⇒ Data s1 r→ Data s2 r
→ Query (Data (s1+s2) r)
dpSelect :: (r→ r′)→ Data s r→ Query (Data s r′)
dpUnion :: Data s1 r→ Data s2 r
→ Query (Data (s1+s2) r)
dpPart :: Ord k ⇒ (r→ k)→ Data s r
→ Map k (Data s r)→ Query (Value a))
→ Query (Map k (Value a))
-- Aggregations (data analyst)
dpCount :: Stb s ⇒ → Data s r→ Query (Value Double)
dpSum :: Stb s ⇒ → Range a b→ (r→ Double)→ Data s r
→ Query (Value Double)
dpAvg :: Stb s ⇒ → Range a b→ (r→ Double)→ Data s r
→ Query (Value Double)
dpMax :: Eq a⇒ → Responses a→ (r→ a)→ Data 1 r
→ Query (Value a)
-- Budget
budget :: Query a→ 
-- Execution (data curator)
dpEval :: (Data 1 r→ Query (Value a))→ [r]→ → IO a
Figure 4: DPella API: Part I
i.e., 1, 2, etc. Stability is a measure that captures the number of rows
in the dataset that could have been aected by transformations like se-
lection or grouping of rows. In DP research, stability is associated with
dataset transformations rather than with datasets themselves. In order
to simplify type signatures, DPella uses the type parameter s in datasets
to represent the accumulated stability of the transformations for which
datasets have gone through—as done in [19]. Dierent than, e.g., PINQ
[38], one novelty of DPella is that it computes stability statically using
Haskell’s type-system.
Values of type Query a represent computations, or queries, that yield
values of type a. Type Query a is a monad [41], and because of this,
computations of type Query a are built by two fundamental operations:
return :: a→ Query a
(>>=) :: Query a→ (a→ Query b)→ Query b
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The operation return x outputs a query that just produces the value
x without causing side-eects, i.e., without touching any dataset. The
function (>>=)—called bind—is used to sequence queries and their as-
sociated side-eects. Specically, qp>>= f executes the query qp, takes
its result, and passes it to the function f, which then returns a second
query to run. Some languages, like Haskell, provide syntactic sugar for
monadic computations known as do-notation. For instance, the program
qp1 >>= (λx1 → qp2 >>= (λx2 → return (x1, x2))), which performs
queries qp1 and qp2 and returns their results in a pair, can be written
as do x1 ← qp1; x2 ← qp2; return (x1, x2) which gives a more “im-
perative” feeling to programs. We split the API in four parts: transfor-
mations, aggregations, budget prediction, and execution of queries—see
next section for the description of API’s accuracy components. The rst
three parts are intended to be used by data analysts, while the last one
is intended to be only used by data curators4.
2.2 Transformations
The primitive dpWhere lters rows in datasets based on a predicate
functions (r → Bool). The created query (of type Query (Data s r))
produces a dataset with the same row type r and accumulated stability s
as the dataset given as argument (Data s r). Observe that if we consider
two datasets which dier in s rows in two given executions, and we apply
dpWhere to both of them, we will obtain datasets that will still dier in
s rows—thus, the accumulated stability remains the same. The primitive
dpGroupBy returns a dataset where rows with the same key are grouped
together. The functional argument (of type r→ k) maps rows to keys
of type k. The rows in the return dataset (Data (2*s) (k, [r ])) consist
of key-rows pairs of type (k, [r])—syntax [r] denotes the type of lists of
elements of type r. What appears on the left-hand side of the symbol⇒
are type constraints. They can be seen as static demands for the types
appearing on the right-hand side of⇒. Type constraint Eq k demands
type k, denoting keys, to support equality; otherwise grouping rows
with the same keys is not possible. The accumulated stability of the new
dataset is multiplied by 2 in accordance with stability calculations for
transformations [38, 19]—observe that 2*s is a type-level multiplication
done by a type-level function (or type family [20]) *. Our API also
considers transformations similar to those found in SQL like intersection
4A separation that can be enforced via Haskell modules [55]
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(dpIntersect), union (dpUnion), and selection (dpSelect) of datasets,
where the accumulated stability is updated accordingly. Providing a
general join transformation is known to be challenging [38, 43, 9, 30].
The output of a join may contain duplicates of sensitive rows, which
makes dicult to bound the accumulated stability of datasets. However,
and similar to PINQ, DPella supports a limited form of joins, where a
limit gets imposed on the number of output records mapped under each
key in order to obtain stability. For brevity, we skip its presentation and
assume that all the considered information is contained by the rows of
given datasets.
2.3 Partition
Primitive dpPart deserves special attention. This primitive is a mixture
of a transformation and aggregations since it partitions the data (transfor-
mation) to subsequently apply aggregations on each of them. More specif-
ically, it splits the given dataset (Data s r) based on a row-to-key map-
ping (r→ k). Then, it takes each partition for a given key k and applies
it to the corresponding function Data s r→ Query (Value a), which
is given as an element of a key-query mapping (Map k ((Data s r)→
Query (Value a))). Subsequently, it returns the values produced at ev-
ery partition as a key-value mapping (Query (Map k (Value a))). The
primitive dpPartRepeat, used by the examples in Section 1, is imple-
mented as a special case of dpPart and thus we do not discuss it further.
Partition is one of the most important operators to save privacy
budget. It allows to run the same query on a dataset’s partitions but only
paying for one of them—recall Theorem 3. The essential assumption
that makes this possible is that every query runs on disjoint datasets.
Unfortunately, data analysts could ignore this assumption when writing
queries.
To illustrate this point, we present the code in Figure 5. Query q pro-
duces an -DP histogram of the colors found in the argument dataset,
which rows are of type Color and variable bins enumerates all the pos-
sible values of such type. The code partitions the dataset by using the
function id :: Color → Color (line 2) and executes the aggregation
counting query (dpCount) in each partition (line 3)—function fromList
creates a map from a list of pairs. The attentive reader could notice that
dpCount is applied to the original dataset rather than the partitions.
This type of errors could lead to break privacy as well as inconsistencies
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1 q :: → [Color]→ Data 1 Double→ Query (Map Color Double)
2 q eps bins dataset = dpPart id dataset dps
3 where dps = fromList [(c, λds→ dpCount eps dataset)
4 -- dps = fromList [(c, λds→ dpCount eps ds
5 | c← bins]
Figure 5: DP-histograms by using dpPart
when estimating the required privacy budget. A correct implementation
consists on executing dpCount on the corresponding partition as shown
in the commented line 4.
To catch coding errors as the one shown above, DPella deploys an
static information-ow control (IFC) analysis similar to that provided
by MAC [51]. IFC ensures that queries run by dpPart do not perform
queries on shared datasets by attaching provenance labels to datasets
Data s r indicating to which part of the query they are associated with
and propagates that information accordingly.
Coming back to our previous example (see Figure 5), the IFC analysis
will assign the provenance of dataset in q to the top-level fragment
of the query rather than to sub-queries executed in each partition—and
DPella will raise an error at compile time when ds is accessed by the
sub-queries! Instead, if we comment line 3 and uncomment line 4, the
query q will be successfully run by DPella (when there is enough privacy
budget) since every partition is only accessing their own partitioned
data (denoted by variable ds).
The implemented IFC mechanism is transparent to data analysts and
curators, i.e., they do not need to understand how it works. Analysts and
curators only need to know that, when the IFC analysis raises an alarm,
is due to a possibly access to non-disjoint datasets when using dpPart.
2.4 Aggregations
DPella presents primitives to count (dpCount), sum (dpSum), and aver-
age (dpAvg) rows in datasets. These primitives take an argument eps :: ,
a dataset, and build a Laplace mechanism which is eps-dierentially pri-
vate from which a noisy result gets return as a term of type Value Double.
The purpose of data type Value a is two fold: to encapsulate noisy val-
ues of type a originating from aggregations of data, and to store informa-
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tion about its accuracy—intuitively, how “noisy” the value is (explained
in Section 3). The injected noise of these queries gets adjusted depend-
ing on three parameters: the value of type , the accumulated stability of
the dataset s, and the sensitivity of the query (recall Denition 2). More
specically, the Laplace mechanism used by DPella uses accumulated sta-
bility s to scale the noise, i.e., it consider b from Theorem 1 as b = s · ∆Q .
The sensitivity of DPella’s aggregations are either hard-coded into the
implementation—similar to what PINQ does—or calculated statically.
The sensitivities of dpSum and dpAvg are determined by the range of
the values under consideration e.i., for the indicated Range a b, the sen-
sitivity is computed as b-a. This is enforced by applying a clipping func-
tion (r→ Double). This function ensures that the values under scrutiny
fall into the interval [a, b] before (and, for dpAvg, after) executing the
query. The sensitivity of dpCount and dpMax is set to 1. To implement
the Laplace mechanism, the type constrain Stb s in dpCount, dpSum,
and dpAvg demands the accumulated stability parameter s to be a type-
level natural number in order to obtain a term-level representation when
injecting noise. Finally, primitive dpMax implements report-noisy-max
[15]. This query takes a list of possible responses (Responses a is a type
synonym for [a ]) and a function of type r → a to be applied to every
row. The implementation of dpMax adds uniform noise to every score—
in this case, the amount of rows voting for a response—and returns the
response with the highest noisy score. This primitive becomes relevant
to obtain the winner option in elections without singling out any voter.
However, it requires that the accumulated stability of the dataset to be 1
in order to be sound [8]. DPella guarantees such requirement by typing:
the type of the given dataset as argument is Data 1 r.
2.5 Privacy budget and execution of queries
The primitive budget statically computes how much privacy budget
is required to run a query. It is worth notice that DPella returns an
upper bound of the required privacy budget rather than the exact one—
an expected consequence of using a type-system to compute it and
provide early feedback to data analysts. Finally, the primitive dpEval
is used by data curators to run queries (Query a) under given privacy
budgets (), where datasets are just lists of rows ([r]). It assumes that
the initial accumulated stability as 1 (Data 1 r) since the dataset has
not yet gone through any transformation, and DPella will automatically
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calculate the accumulated stability for datasets aected by subsequent
transformations via the Haskell’s type system. This primitive returns a
computation of type IO a, which in Haskell are computations responsible
to perform side-eects—in this case, obtaining randomness from the
system in order to implement the Laplace mechanism.
2.6 Implementation
DPella is implemented as a deep embedded domain-specic language
(EDSL) in Haskell. Due to such design choice, data analysts can piggyback
on Haskell’s infrastructure to build queries in a creative way. For instance,
it is possible to leverage on any of Haskell’s pure functions. The following
one-liner (of type Query [Value Double ]) shows how to write a query
that generates possibly non-disjoint datasets from ds :: Data s r based
on dierent criteria for then performing a counting.
mapM (flip dpSelect ds>=>dpCount eps) fs
Variable eps is the epsilon to spend in each counting while fs :: [r →
Bool ] is the criteria list. The high-order functions flip, mapM, and (>=>)
are standard in Haskell and represent a function who switches arguments,
the monadic versions of map, and the Kleisli arrow, respectively. Despite
DPella being a rst-order interface, data analysts can use Haskell’s high-
order functions to compactly describe queries.
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DPella uses the data type Value a responsible to store a result of
type a as well as information about its accuracy. For instance, a term of
type Value Double stores a noisy number (e.g., coming from executing
dpCount) together with its accuracy in terms of a bound on the noise
introduced to protect privacy.
DPella provides an static analysis capable to compute the accuracy
of queries via the following function
accuracy :: Query (Value a)→ β → α
which takes as an argument a query and returns a function, called inverse
Cumulative Distribution Function (iCDF), capturing the theoretical error
α for a given condence 1-β. Function accuracy does not execute
queries but rather symbolically interpret all of its components in order
to compute the accuracy of the result based on the sub-queries and
how data gets aggregated. DPella follows the principle of improving
accuracy calculations by detecting statistical independence. For that, it
implements taint analysis [53] in order to track if values were drawn
from statistically independent distributions.
3.1 Accuracy calculations
DPella starts by generating iCDFs at the time of running aggregations
based on the following known result of the Laplace mechanism:
Denition 3.1.1 (Accuracy for the Laplace mechanism). Given a
randomized query Q˜(·) : db→ R implemented with the Laplace mecha-
nism as in Theorem 1, we have that
Pr
[
|Q˜(D)−Q(D)| > log(1/β) · ∆Q

]
6 β (3)
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-- Accuracy analysis (data analyst)
accuracy :: Query (Value a)→ β → α
-- Norms (data analyst)
norm∞ :: [Value Double]→ Value [Double]
norm2 :: [Value Double]→ Value [Double]
norm1 :: [Value Double]→ Value [Double]
rmsd :: [Value Double]→ Value [Double]
-- Accuracy combinators (data analyst)
add :: [Value Double]→ Value Double
neg :: Value Double→ Value Double
Figure 6: DPella API: Part II
Recall that the Laplace mechanism used by DPella utilizes accumu-
lated stability s to scale the noise, i.e., it consider b from Theorem 1 as
b = s · ∆Q . Consequently, DPella stores the iCDF λβ → log(1/β) ·s ·
∆Q

for the values of type Value Double returned by aggregation primi-
tives like dpCount, dpSum, and dpAvg. However, queries are often more
complex than just calling aggregation primitives—as shown by CDF2 in
Figure 2b. In this light, DPella provides combinators responsible to ag-
gregate noisy values, while computing its iCDFs based on the iCDFs of
the arguments. Figure 6 shows DPella API when dealing with accuracy.
3.1.1 Norms
DPella exposes primitives to aggregate the magnitudes of several er-
rors predictions into a single measure—a useful tool when dealing with
vectors. Primitives norm∞, norm2, and norm1 take a list of values of
type Value Double, where each of them carries accuracy information,
and produces a single value (or vector) that contains a list of elements
(Value [Double ]) whose accuracy is set to be the well-known `∞-, `2-,
`1-norms, respectively. Finally, primitive rmsd implements root-mean-
square deviation among the elements given as arguments. In our exam-
ples, we focus on using norm∞, but other norms are available for the
taste, and preference, of data analysts.
3.1.2 Adding values
The primitive add aggregates values and, in order to compute accuracy
of the addition, it tries to apply the Cherno bound if all the values are
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Figure 7: Union vs. Cherno bounds
statistically independent; otherwise, it applies the union bound. More
precisely, for the next denitions we assume that primitive add receives
n terms v1 ::Value Double, v2 ::Value Double, ... , vn ::Value Double.
Importantly, since we are calculating the theoretical error, we should
consider random variables rather than specic numbers. The next de-
nition species how add behaves when applying union bound.
Denition 3.1.2 (add using union bound). Given n > 2 random
variables Vj with their respective iCDF j , where j ∈ 1 . . . n, and αj =
iCDFj(
β
n), then the addition Z =
∑n
j=1 Vj has the following accuracy:
Pr[|Z| >∑nj=1 αj ] 6 β (4)
Observe that to compute the iCDF ofZ , the formula uses the iCDFs
from the operands applied to βn . Union bound makes no assumption
about the distribution of the random variables Vj .
In contrast, the Cherno bound often provides a tighter error estima-
tion than the commonly used union bound when adding several statisti-
cally independent queries sampled from a Laplace distribution. To illus-
trate this point, Figure 7 shows that dierence for the cdf2 function we
presented in Section 1 with  = 0.5 (for each DP sub-query) and β = 0.1.
Clearly, the Cherno bound is asymptotically much better when estimat-
ing accuracy, while the union bound works best with a reduced number
of sub-queries—observe how lines get crossed in Figure 7. In this light,
and when possible, DPella computes both union bound and Cherno
bound and selects the tighter error estimation. However, to apply Cher-
no bound, DPella needs to be certain that the events are independent.
Before explaining how DPella detects that, we give an specication of
the formula we use for Cherno.
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Denition 3.1.3 (add using Cherno bound [12]). Given n > 2 in-
dependent random variables Vj ∼ Lap(0, bj), where j ∈ 1 . . . n, bM =
max {bj}j=1...n, and ν > max{
√∑n
j=1 b
2
j , bM
√
ln 2β}, then the addi-
tion Z =
∑n
j=1 Vj has the following accuracy:
Pr[|Z| > ν ·
√
8 ln 2β ] 6 β (5)
DPella uses the value ν = max{
√∑n
j=1 b
2
j , bM
√
ln 2β}+0.00001 to
satisfy the conditions of the denition above when applying the Cherno
bound—any other positive increment to the computed maximum works
as well5.
Lastly, to support subtraction, DPella provides primitive neg respon-
sible to change the sign of a given value. We next explain how DPella
checks that values come from statistically independent sampled vari-
ables.
3.1.3 Detecting statistical independence
To detect statistical independence, we apply taint analysis when con-
sidering terms of type Value a. Specically, every time a result of type
Value Double gets generated by an aggregation query in DPella’s API
(i.e., dpCount, dpSum, etc.), it gets assigned a label indicating that it is
untainted and thus statistically independent. The label also carries in-
formation about the scale of the Laplace distribution from which it was
sampled—a useful information when applying Denition 3.1.3. When
the primitive add receives all untainted values as arguments, the ac-
curacy of the aggregation is determined by the best estimation pro-
vided by either the union bound (Denition 3.1.2) or the Cherno bound
(Denition 3.1.3). Importantly, values produced by add are considered
tainted since they depend on other results. When add receives any
tainted argument, it proceeds to estimate the error of the addition by
just using union bound. As an example, Figure 8 presents the query plan
totalCount which adds the results of hundred dpCount queries over
dierent datasets, namely ds1, ds2, . . . , ds100. (The ... denotes code
intentionally left unspecied.) The code calls the primitive add with
5 There are perhaps other ways to compute the Cherno bound for the sum of
independent Laplace distributions, changing this equation in DPella does not require
major work.
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1 totalCount :: Query (Value Double)
2 totalCount = do
3 v1 ← dpCount 0.3 ds1
4 v2 ← dpCount 0.25 ds2
5 ...
6 v100 ← dpCount 0.5 ds100
7 return (add [v1, v2, ..., v100 ])
Figure 8: Combination of sub-queries results
the results of calling dpCount. (We use [x1, x2, x3 ] to denote the list
with elements x1, x2, and x3.) What would it be then the theoretical er-
ror of totalCount? The accuracy calculation depends on whether all
the values are untainted in line 7. When no dependencies are detected
between v1, v2, . . . , v100, namely all the values are untainted, DPella
applies Cherno bound in order to give a tighter error estimation. In-
stead, for instance, if v3 was computed as an aggregation of v1 and v2,
e.g., let v3 = add [v1, v2 ], then line 7 applies union bound since v3 is a
tainted value. With taint analysis, DPella is capable to detect dependen-
cies among terms of type Value Double, and leverages that information
to apply dierent concentrations bounds.
In the next Section, we proceed to formally dene our accuracy
analysis.
3.2 Implementation
The accuracy analysis consists on symbolically interpreting a given
query, calculating the accuracy of individual parts, and then combining
them using our taint analysis. We introduce two polymorphic symbolic
values: D :: Data s r and S[iCDF, s, ts] :: Value a. Symbolic dataset
D represents concrete datasets arising from data transformations. A
symbolic value S[iCDF, s, ts] represents concrete values with tags ts
and a iCDF which is computed assuming a noise scale s. Tags are used
to detect the provenance of symbolic values and when they arise from
dierent noisy sources.
Function accuracy takes queries producing results of type Value a.
Such queries are essentially built by performing data aggregation queries
(e.g., dpCount) preceded by a (possibly empty) sequence of other primi-
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tives like data transformations6. Figures 9 and 10 show the interesting
parts of our analysis. Given a well-typed query q :: Query (Value a),
accuracy q = iCDF where qB S[iCDF, s, ts] for some s and ts. The
rules in 9 are mainly split into two cases: considering data aggregation
queries and sequences of primitives glued together with (>>=).
DPCount
dataset :: Data s r iCDF = λβ → log( 1
β
) · s · 1

t fresh
dpCount  datasetB S[iCDF, s · 1

, {t}]
DPMax
dataset :: Data 1 r iCDF = λβ → 4

· log(length res
β
)
dpMax  res vote dsB S[iCDF, 0, ∅]
(a) DP-queries
Seq-Trans
k D  ∗ next nextB S[iCDF, s, ts]
transform>>= kB S[iCDF, s, ts]
Seq-Q_uery
queryB S[iCDFq, sq, tsq]
k (S[iCDFq, sq, tsq]) ∗ next nextB S[iCDF, s, ts]
query>>= kB S[iCDF, s, ts]
(b) Sequential traversal
Seq-Part
(m j D  ∗ nextj)j∈dom(m)
(nextj B S[iCDFj , sj , tsj ])j∈dom(m) m’ = (j 7→ S[iCDFj , sj , tsj ])j∈dom(m)
k m’ ∗ next nextB S[iCDF, s, ts]
dpPart sel dataset m>>= kB S[iCDF, s, ts]
(c) Accuracy calculation when partitioning data
Figure 9: Accuracy analysis implemented by accuracy
6We ignore the case of return val :: Query (Value a) since the denition of
accuracy is trivial for such case.
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The symbolic interpretation of dpCount is captured by rule DP-
Count—see Figure 9a. This rule populates the iCDF of the return sym-
bolic value with the corresponding error calculations for Laplace as pre-
sented in Denition 3.3.2 (with the scale adjusted with the accumulated
stability). Observe that it extracts the stability information from the type
of the considered dataset (ds :: Data s r) and attaches a fresh tag indi-
cating an independently generated noisy value. The symbolic interpre-
tation of dpSum and dpAvg proceeds similarly to dpCount and we thus
omit them for brevity.
Rule DPMax shows the symbolic interpretation of dpMax whose
iCDF aligns with the one appearing in [8]. Observe that the return value
is tainted. The reason for that relies in the fact that the result, which is
one of the responses in res, contains no noise—it is rather the process
that lead to determining the winning response which has been “noisy.”
In this light, no scale of noise nor distribution can be associated to the
response—as we did, for instance, with dpCount.
To symbolically interpret a sequence of primitives, the analysis gets
further split into two cases depending if the rst operation to interpret
is a transformation or an aggregation, respectively—see Figure 9b. Rule
Seq-Trans considers the former, where transform can be any of the
transformation operations in Figure 4. It simply uses the symbolic value
D to pass it to the continuation k. It can happen that k D does not match
(yet) any part of DPella’s API required for our analysis to continue 7.
However, the EDSL nature of DPella makes Haskell’s to reduce k D to the
next primitive to be considered, which we capture as k D  ∗ next—and
we know that it will occur thanks to type preservation. We represent 
( ∗) to pure reduction(s) in the host language like function application,
pair projections, list comprehension, etc. The analysis then continues
symbolically interpreting the next yield instruction. Rule Seq-Q_uery
computes the corresponding symbolic value for the aggregation query.
The symbolic value is then passed to the continuation, and the analysis
continues with the next yield instruction.
Rule Seq-Part shows the symbolic interpretation of dpPart. The
argument m :: Map k (Data s r → Query (Value a)) describes the
queries to execute once given the corresponding bins. Since these queries
produce values, we need to symbolically interpret each of them to obtain
their accuracy estimations. The rule applies each of those queries to a
7For instance, k D = (λx → dpCount 1 x) D, and thus ((λx →
dpCount 1 x) D) ∗ dpCount 1 D.
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symbolic dataset (m j D) 8. The symbolic values yield by each bin are
collected into the mapping m’, which is then passed to continuation k
in order to continue the analysis on the next yield instruction.
3.2.1 Concentration Bounds
Figure 10 shows the part of our analysis responsible to apply concentra-
tion bounds. Rules Union-Bound and Chernoff-Bound dene pure
functions (reduction ) which produce the concentration bounds as
described in Denitions 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, respectively. We dene the func-
tion add based on two cases. Rule Add-Union produces a symbolic
value with a iCDF generated by the union bound (ub [v1, v2, ..., vn ]).
The symbolic value is tainted, which is denoted by the empty tags (∅).
The scale 0 denotes that the scale of the noise and its distribution is
unknown—adding Laplace distributions do not yield a Laplace distribu-
tion. (However, the situation is dierent with Gaussians, see Section 3.3)
Union-Bound
vj = S[iCDFj, sj, tsj] αj = iCDFj( b
n
) iCDF = λβ →
n∑
j=1
αj
ub [v1, v2, ..., vn ] iCDF
Chernoff-Bound
vj = S[iCDFj, sj, tsj] vM = max {sj}j=1...n
ν = max{
√∑n
j=1 s
2
j , vM
√
ln 2
β
}+ 0.0001 iCDF = λβ → ν ·
√
8 ln 2
β
cb [v1, v2, ..., vn ] iCDF
Add-Union
(∃j · tsj = ∅) ∨⋂j=1...n tsj 6= ∅
add [v1, v2, ..., vn ] S[ub [v1, v2, ..., vn ], 0, ∅]
Add-Chernoff-Union
vj = S[iCDFj, sj, tsj] (∀j · tsj 6= ∅) ⋂j=1...n tsj = ∅
iCDF = λβ → min (ub [v1, v2, ..., vn ] β) (cb [v1, v2, ..., vn ] β)
add [v1, v2, ..., vn ] S[iCDF, 0, ∅]
Figure 10: Calculation of concentration bounds
8For simplicity, we assume that maps are implemented as functions
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Norm-Inf
vj = S[iCDFj, sj, tsj] iCDF = λβ → max {|iCDFj(β
n
)|}j=1...n
norm∞ [v1, v2, ..., vn ] S[iCDFM, 0, ∅]
Norm-1
vj = S[iCDFj, sj, tsj] iCDF = λβ →
n∑
j=1
|iCDFj(β
n
)|
norm1 [v1, v2, ..., vn ] S[iCDF, 0, ∅]
Figure 11: Calculation of norms
This rule gets exercised when either the list of symbolic values con-
tains a tainted one (∃j · tsj = ∅) or have not been independently gener-
ated (
⋂
k=1...n tsj 6= ∅). Dierently, Add-Chernoff-Union produces a
symbolic value with a iCDF which chooses the minimum error estima-
tion between union and Cherno bound for a given β—sometimes union
bound provides tighter estimations when aggregating few noisy-values
(recall Figure 7). This rule triggers when all the values are untainted
(∀j · tsj 6= ∅) and independently generated (
⋂
j=1...n tsj = ∅). At a
rst glance, one could believe that it would be enough to use the scale of
the noise to track when values are untainted, i.e., if the scale is dierent
from 0, then the value is untainted. Unfortunately, this design choice is
unsound: it will classify adding a variable twice as an independent sum:
do x ← dpCount  ds; return (add [x, x]). It is also possible to con-
sider various ways to add symbolic values to boost accuracy. We could
easily write a pre-processing function which, for instance, rstly parti-
tions the arguments into subset of independently generated values, ap-
plies add to them (thus triggering Add-Chernoff-Union), and nally
applies add to the obtained results (thus triggering Add-Union). The
implementation of DPella enables to write such functions in a few lines
of code.
3.2.2 Norms calculation
Figure 11 shows our static analysis when computing norm∞ and norm1,
respectively. There is nothing special about the rules except to note that
the results are symbolic values which are tainted. The reason for that
is that norms are designed to condense (in one measure) the error of
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the list of the arguments. By doing so, it is hard to assign an specic
Laplace distribution with sensitivity s to the overall given vector. We
simply say that the return symbolic values are tainted—thus they can
only be aggregated by Add-Union in Figure 10.
3.3 Accuracy of Gaussian mechanism
As aforementioned, DPella supports other notions of dierential privacy—
such as approximate dierential privacy—together with the use of the
Gaussian mechanism. Specically, DPella supports a relaxation of the
notion of dierential privacy known as (, δ)-DP, formally dened as
follow.
Denition 3.3.1 ((, δ)-Dierential Privacy[17]).A randomized query
Q˜(·) : db→ R satises (, δ)-dierential privacy, with , δ > 0, if and
only if for any two datasetsD1 andD2 in db, which dier in one row, and
for every output set S ⊆ R we have
Pr[Q˜(D1) ∈ S] 6 e Pr[Q˜(D2) ∈ S] + δ (6)
The main dierence between this notion of privacy and the one
described in Theorem 1 is that (, δ)-DP introduces the probability mass
δ that, intuitively, oers a probabilistic notion of privacy loss. More
concretely, (, δ)-DP ensures that for all adjacent datasets, the absolute
value of the privacy loss will be bounded by  with probability 1 − δ.
Observe that when δ = 0, an (, 0)-DP query satises pure -DP.
A standard implementation of (, δ)-DP queries is based on the addi-
tion of noise sampled from the Gauss distribution, this is, forQ : db→ R
an arbitrary function with sensitivity ∆Q (as described in Denition 2)
the Gaussian mechanism with parameter σ adds noise scaled toN (0, σ2)
to its output. When the noise to be added is calibrated in terms of , δ,
and ∆Q, the Gaussian mechanism satises (, δ)-DP as stated on the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 3.3.1 (Gaussian Mechanism [2]). For any , δ ∈ (0, 1),
the Gaussian output perturbation mechanism with standard deviation
σ = ∆Q
√
2 log(1.25δ )/ is (, δ)-dierentially private
Similarly as with the Laplace mechanism, to provide bound estimates
on the errors caused by the addition of Gaussian noise, DPella keeps track
of Gauss’ inverse Cummulative Distribution Function (iCDF). By following
the general form of accuracy introduced in Denition 2, we have that:
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DPCount
dataset :: Data s r
σ = s · 1 ·
√
2 · log(1.25/δ)/ iCDF = λβ → σ ·
√
2 · log(2/β) t fresh
dpCount  datasetB S[iCDF, σ2, {t}]
(a) Aggregations
Chernoff-Bound-Gauss
vj = S[iCDFj, sj, tsj] iCDF = λβ →
√
2 ·∑nj=1 sj · log (1/β)
cb [v1, v2, ..., vn ] iCDF
Add-Chernoff-Union
vj = S[iCDFj, sj, tsj] (∀j · tsj 6= ∅) ⋂j=1...n tsj = ∅
iCDF = λβ → min (ub [v1, v2, ..., vn ] β) (cb [v1, v2, ..., vn ] β)
add [v1, v2, ..., vn ] S[iCDF,∑nj=1 sj,⋃j=1...n tsj]
(b) Concentration bounds
Figure 12: Accuracy analysis for Gaussian mechanism
Denition 3.3.2 (Accuracy for the Gaussian mechanism). Given
a randomized query Q˜(·) : db → R implemented with the Gaussian
mechanism as previously described, then
Pr
[
|Q˜(D)−Q(D)| > σ
√
2 log (2/β)
]
6 β (7)
where the iCDF to be stored by DPella refers to the function λβ →
σ
√
2 log (2/β).
From an implementation standpoint, adding the Gaussian mecha-
nism to our framework does not alter signicantly the presented prim-
itives, and, in particular, privacy’s preservation remains (almost) un-
changed. The most signicant changes can be seen when calculating the
accuracy of aggregations and their combinations.
The symbolic interpretation of aggregations is updated accordingly
to keep track of Gauss’ iCDF, as well as, its respective noise scale de-
termined by σ2 as depicted in Figure 12a for the case of dpCount. Ad-
ditionally, Figure 12b shows how concentration bounds are applied for
the case of the Gaussian mechanism—Union-Bound and Add-Union
are omitted since they are the same as the ones in Figure 10. In general,
the accuracy analysis for addition of aggregations follows the one pre-
sented previously for the Laplace mechanism. The main dierence is seen
36
3.3. Accuracy of Gaussian mechanism
1 totalCountG :: Query (Value Double)
2 totalCountG = do
3 v1 ← dpCount (0.3 , 1e-5) ds1
4 v2 ← dpCount (0.25, 1e-5) ds2
5 ...
6 v100 ← dpCount (0.5 , 1e-3) ds100
7 let h1 = add [v1, v2, ..., v50 ]
8 let h2 = add [v51, v52, ..., v100 ]
9 return (add [h1, h2 ])
Figure 13: Combining sub-queries under Gaussian mechanism
when adding independent values. In this case, we use the well-known
fact the addition of independent normally distributed random variables
is also normally distributed. This means that after executing the Add-
Chernoff-Union we do not lose information about the distribution of
our result as we used to do under the Laplacian setting. This eect can
be seen in the generated symbolic value S[iCDF,∑nj=1 sj ,⋃j=1...n tsj ]
where
∑n
j=1 sj indicates that the variance of the new value is calculated
as the addition of the variances of the components being added, and⋃
j=1...n tsj indicates that the new value is statistically dependent of
the involved values.
This is an useful feature when combining queries in batches, for in-
stance, Figure 13 shows the query plan totalCountG that adds the re-
sults of hundred queries—using Gaussian dpCount that takes as input the
tuple (, δ) and the dataset—similar to the one presented in Figure 8, but
it does so by adding the rst half of the queries (line 9), then the second
half (line 10), and nally returning the addition of the two halves (line
12). How will DPella calculate the theoretical error of totalCountG?
Observe that h1 and h2 are constructed as combinations of untainted
values, meaning that when performing the additions at lines 7-8, the
Cherno bound could be triggered. More importantly, DPella still have
information about their distribution. Furthermore, h1 and h2 are statis-
tically independent (they do not share sub-queries), so when comput-
ing their addition at line 9, Cherno bound could also be triggered, this
could not have been possible under the Laplace mechanism, since once
a value is calculated as a combination of values, their distribution be-
comes unknown and only union bound could be applied. In this sense,
the Gaussian mechanism might yield tighter error bounds when dealing
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with queries that are created in batches, specially when the number of
batches is big enough to trigger the use of the Cherno bound.
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Case studies
In this section, we will discuss the advantages and limitations of
our programming framework. Moreover, we will go in-depth into using
DPella to analyze the interplay of privacy and accuracy parameters in
hierarchical histograms.
4.1 DPella expressiveness
First, we start by exploring the expressiveness of DPella. For this, we
have built several analyses found in the DP literature—see Table 1—
which we classify into two categories, PINQ-like queries and counting
queries. The former class allows us to compare DPella expressivity with
the one of PINQ, while the latter with APEx.
PINQ-like queries We have implemented most of PINQ’s examples [38,
37], such as, dierent versions of CDFs (sequential, parallel, and hybrid)
and network tracing-like analyses (such as determining the frequency
a term or several terms have been searched by the users, and comput-
ing port’s and packets’ size distribution); additionally, we considered
analyses of cumulative sums [3]—which are queries that share some
commonalities with CDFs. The interest over dierentially private CDFs
and cumulative partial sums applications rely on the existing several ap-
proaches to inject noise, such choices will directly impact the accuracy
of our results, and therefore, are ideal to be tested and analyzed in DPella.
The structures of these examples follow closely the ones of the CDFs pre-
sented in previous sections, which are straightforward implementations.
DPella supports these queries naturally since its expressiveness relies on
its primitives and, by construction, they follow PINQ’s ones very closely.
However, as stated in previous sections, our framework goes a step fur-
ther and exposes to data analysts the accuracy bound achieved by the
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Category Application Programs
PINQ-like
CDFs [37] cdf1, cdf2,
cdfSmart
Term fre-
quency [38]
queryFreq,
queriesFreq
Network
analysis [37]
packetSize,
portSize
Cumulative
sums [3]
cumulSum1
cumulSum2
cumulSumSmart
Counting
queries
Range queries via Identity,
Histograms [28], and
Wavelet [59]
i_n
h_n
y_n
Table 1: Implemented literature examples
specic implementation. This feature allows data analyst to reason about
accuracy of the results—without actually executing the query—by vary-
ing i) the strategy of the implementation ii) the parameters of the query.
For instance, in Section 1, we have shown how an analyst can inspect the
error of a sequential and parallel strategy to compute the CDF of packet
lengths. Furthermore, the data analyst can take advantage of DPella being
an embedded DSL and write a Haskell function that takes any of the ap-
proaches (cdf1 or cdf2) and varies epsilon aiming to certain error toler-
ance (for a xed condence interval), or vice versa. Such a function can be
as simple as a brute force analysis or as complex as an heuristic algorithm.
Counting queries To compare our approach with the tool APEx [24], we
consider range queries analyses—an specic subclass of counting queries.
APEx uses the matrix mechanism [33] to compute counting queries. This
algorithm answers a set of linear queries (called the workload) by cali-
brating the noise to specic properties of the workload while preserving
dierential privacy. More in detail, the matrix mechanism uses some
query strategies as an intermediate device to answer a workload; return-
ing a DP version of the query strategies (obtained using the Laplace or
Gaussian mechanism), from which noisy answers of the workload are
derived. The matrix mechanism achieves an almost optimal error on
counting queries. To achieve such error, the algorithm uses several non-
trivial transformations which cannot be implemented easily in terms of
other components. APEx implements it as a black-box and we could do
the same in DPella (see Section 6). Instead, in this section we show how
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Figure 14: Workload of all range queries and query strategies for 4
ranges
DPella can be directly used to answer sets of counting queries using
some of the ideas behind the design of the matrix mechanism, and how
these answers improve with respect to answering the queries naively,
thanks to the use of partition and the Cherno bound.
To do this, we have implemented several strategies to answer an spe-
cic workload WR: the set of all range queries over a domain. Figure 14
illustrates the workload that would be answer for a frequency count of
four ranges. The identity strategy I4, represents 4 queries (number of
rows) computing the noisy count of each range (number of columns).
The hierarchical strategy H4 contains seven queries representing a bi-
nary hierarchy of sums, while the wavelet strategy Y4 contains four
queries representing the Haar wavelet matrix.
Our implementation generates noisy counts and any possible com-
bination of them will yield (at least) the same error as using strategy
I4. In other words, the more accurate answer for WR will be yield by
the identity strategy. This is not unexpected, since in order to use the
other queries strategies more eciently we would need transformations
similar to the ones used in the matrix mechanism.
Figure 15 exposes the error of answering each range query (i.e., each
row) in WR with strategy In and n = 512. While we use the same kind
of plot, this error cannot be directly compared with the one shown in
Figure 7 of [33], since we use a dierent error metrics: (α,β)-accuracy vs
MSE. Nonetheless, we share the tendency of having lower error on small
ranges and signicant error on large ranges. Now, since the noisy values
that will be added (using the function add) are statistically independent,
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Figure 15: Error of each range query in WR using strategy In with
n = 512,  = 1, and β = 0.05
we can use the Cherno bound to show that the error is approximately
O(√n) for each range query, and a maximum error of O(√n log n)
for answering any query in WR. If we compare our maximum error
O(√n log n)with the one of the matrix mechanism based on the identity
strategy O(n/2), it becomes evident how Cherno bound is useful to
provide tighter accuracy bounds. Unfortunately, as previously stated, the
error of strategies Hn and Yn in DPella is not better than the one of the
strategy In, so we cannot reach the same accuracy the matrix mechanism
achieves with these strategies (see Figure 7 of [33]). This limitation
can be addressed by leveraging the fact that DPella is a programming
framerwork that could be extended by adding the matrix mechanism—
and some other features—as black-box primitives.
4.2 Privacy and accuracy trade-o analysis
We study histograms with certain hierarchical structure (commonly seen
in Census Bureaus analyses) where dierent accuracy requirements are
imposed per level and where varying one privacy or accuracy parameter
can have a cascade impact on the privacy or accuracy of others. We con-
sider the scenario where we would like to generate histograms from the
Adult database9 to perform studies on gender balance. The information
that we need to mine is not only an histogram of the genders (for sim-
plicity, just male and female) but also how the gender distributes over
age, and within that, how age distributes over nationality—thus expos-
ing a hierarchical structure of three levels.
9https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/adult
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1 hierarchical1 [e1, e2, e3 ] dat = do
2 -- h1 :: Map Gen (Value Double)
3 -- h2 :: Map (Gen, Age) (Value Double)
4 -- h3 :: Map (Gen, Age, Nationality) (Value Double)
5 h1 ← byGen e1 dat
6 h2 ← byGenAge e2 dat
7 h3 ← byGenAgeNat e3 dat
8 return (h1, h2, h3)
(a) Hierarchical histogram I: distribute budget among the levels
9 hierarchical2 e dat = do
10 h3 ← byGenAgeNat e dat
11 h2 ← level2 h3
12 h1 ← level1 h3
13 return (h1, h2, h3)
(b) Hierarchical histogram II: spend budget only on the most detailed histogram
Figure 16: Implementation of hierarchical histograms
Our rst approach is depicted in Figure 16a, where hierarchical1
generates three histograms with dierent levels of details. This query
puts together the results produced by queries byGen, byGenAge, and
byGenAgeNationality where each query generates an histogram of
the specied set of attributes. Observe that these sub-queries are called
with potentially dierent epsilons, namely e1, e2, and e3, then under
sequential composition, we expect hierarchical1 to be e1+e2+e3-
dierentially private.
We proceed to explore the possibilities to tune the privacy and accu-
racy parameters to our needs. In this case, we want a condence of 95%
for accuracy, i.e., β = 0.05, with a total budget of 3 ( = 3). We could
manually try to take the budget  = 3 and distribute it to the dierent
histograms in many dierent ways and analyze the implication for accu-
racy by calling accuracy on each sub-query. Instead, we write a small
(simple, brute force) optimizer in Haskell that splits the budget uniformly
among the queries, i.e., e1 = 1, e2 = 1, and e3 = 1, and tries to nd the
minimum epsilon that meets the accuracy demands per histogram. In
other words, we are interested in minimizing the privacy loss at each
level bounding the maximum accepted error. The optimizer essentially
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Histogram α tolerance Status  α
byGen 100 X 0.06 61.48
byGenAge 100 X 0.06 96.13
byGenAgeNat 100 X 0.11 85.74
byGen 10 X 0.41 8.99
byGenAge 50 X 0.16 36.05
byGenAgeNat 5 ×MaxBud 1 9.43
byGen 5 X 0.76 4.85
byGenAge 5 ×MaxBud 1 5.76
byGenAgeNat 10 X 0.96 9.82
Table 2: Budgeting with α tolerances, β = 0.05, & total  = 3
adjusts the dierent epsilons and calls accuracy during the minimiza-
tion process. To ensure termination, the optimizer aborts after a xed
number of calls to accuracy, or when the local budget ei is exhausted.
Table 2 shows some of our ndings. The rst row shows what hap-
pens when we impose an error of 100 at every level of detail, i.e., each bar
in all the histograms could be at most +/− 100 o. Then, we only need
to spend a little part of our budget—the optimizer nds the minimum ep-
silons that adheres to the accuracy constrains. Instead, the second row
shows that if we ask to be gradually more accurate on more detailed
histograms, then the optimizer could fulll the rst two demands and
aborted on the most detailed histogram (byGenAgeNat) since it could
not nd an epsilon that fullls that requirement—the best we can do is
spending all the budget and obtain and error bound of 9.43. Finally, the
last row shows what happens if we want gradually tighter error bounds
on the less detailed histograms. In this case, the middle layer can be “al-
most” fullled by expending all the budget and obtaining an error bound
of 5.76 instead of 5. While the results from Table 2 could be acceptable
for some data analysts, they might not be for others.
We propose an alternative manner to implement the same query
which consists on spending privacy budget only for the most detailed
histogram. As shown in Figure 16b, this new approach spends all the bud-
get e on calling h3 ← byGenAgeNat e dat. Subsequently, the algorithm
builds the other histograms based on the information extracted from the
most detailed one. For that, we add the noisy values of h3 (using helper
functions level2 and level1) creating the rest of the histograms repre-
senting the Cartesian products of gender and age, and gender, respec-
tively. These methodology will use add and norm∞ to compute the de-
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Figure 17: hierarchical1 vs. hierarchical2
rived histograms, and therefore will not consume more privacy budget.
Observe that the query proceeds in a bottom-up fashion, i.e., it starts with
the most detailed histogram and nishes with the less detailed one. Now
that we have two implementations, which one is better? Which one yields
the better trade-os between privacy and accuracy? Figure 17 shows the
accuracy of the dierent level of histograms, i.e., h1, h2, and h3, when
xing β = 0.05 and a global budget of  = 1 (h1-1, h2-2, and h3-3)
and  = 3 (h1-3, h2-3, and h3-3)—we obtained all this information by
running repetitively the function accuracy. Form the graphics, we can
infer that the splitting of the privacy budget per level often gives rise to
more accurate histograms. However, observe the exception when  = 3
for hierarchical2: in this case, hierarchical1 will use an  = 1 in
that histogram so it will receive a more noisy count than using  = 3.
4.3 K-way marginal queries on synthetic data
When compared with (non-compositional) approaches for estimating ac-
curacy based on synthetic or public data, such as [29], the static analysis
of DPella can be used in a complimentary manner to quickly (and pre-
cisely) estimate privacy and accuracy for a wide range of simple queries.
There are certain kind of queries where it is more convenient to use our
static analysis than synthetic data for high-dimensional datasets.
As an example, we focus on the problem of releasing, in a dier-
entially private manner, the k-way marginals of a binary dataset D ∈
(0, 1d)n. This is a classical learning problem that has been extensively
studied in the DP literature, see [56, 22, 13] among others. A k-marginal
query, also called a k-conjunction, returns the count of how many in-
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1 -- Perform all 3-way combinations up to attribute dim
2 allChecks :: → Int→ Data s BinR→ [Query (Value Double)]
3 allChecks localEps dim db = do
4 (i, j, k)← combinatory (dim-1) 3
5 let allOne r = (r !! i) ≡ (r !! j) ≡ (r !! k) ≡ 1
6 return (do tab← dpWhere allOne db
7 dpCount localEps tab
8 )
9 -- Compute k-way marginals
10 threeMarginal :: → Int→ Data s BinR→ Query (Value [Double])
11 threeMarginal localEps dim db = do
12 checks← sequence (allChecks localEps dim db)
13 return (norm∞ checks)
Figure 18: K-way marginal implementation
dividual records in D have k < d attributes set to certain values. For
simplicity, we will work with 3-way marginal queries to compare perfor-
mance between DPella and using synthetic data. The goal of our analy-
sis is to release all the 3-way marginals of a dataset. This is implemented
through the functions depicted in Figure 18.
Function allChecks counts how many records have 3-attributes
set to 1. Auxiliary function combinatory d k generates k-tuples aris-
ing from the combination of indexes 0, 1, . . . , d taken k at the time. In
our example, the number of generated tuples is
(dim
3
)
. For each tuple,
allChecks lters the rows which have attributes i, j, and k set to 1
(implemented as dpWhere allOne db) for then making a noisy count
(dpCount localEps tab). Lastly, function threeMarginal collects the
counts for the dierent considered attributes and places them into a vec-
tor (norm∞ checks).
We run threeMarginal considering a synthetic dataset (db) which
has only 1 row with all the attributes set to zeros. Setting all the attributes
to zero produces that all the counts are 0, thus we are able to measure the
noisy on each run and accuracy accordingly. We run threeMarginal
approx. 1000 times for each dimension to measure the noisy magnitude,
where we took the 1-β percentile with β = 0.05 (as we did in many
of our case studies). Observe that we have
(dim
3
)
queries and so
(dim
3
)
independent sources of noise, which need an high number of runs to
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Figure 19: Performance comparison between accuracy (DPella) and
estimating errors using synthetic analysis
be well-represented. In general, for this kind of task one is interested
in bounding the max error that can occur in one of the queries (the `∞
norm over the output). For this task, the empirical error is well aligned
with the theoretical one provided by DPella by calling the function
accuracy. The latter is computed by taking a union bound over the
error of each individual query. For each query we have a tight bound
and the union bound gives us a tight bound over the max. However, we
observe a signicant dierent in performance.
Figure 19 shows (in log scale) the time dierence when calculating
accuracy by DPella and on synthetic data when the dimension of the
dataset increases. Already in low dimension, the dierence in perfor-
mance is many orders of magnitude in favor of DPella—a tendency that
does not change when the dimension goes above 20. The main reason
for that comes down to that DPella, as an static analysis, do not execute
the ltering dpWhere allOne db (as well as any other transformation,
recall Section 3.2) which an approach based on synthetic data should do
many times—in our case 1000 iterations for each dimension. We expect
that for more complex tasks this dierence is even more evident.
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Testing accuracy
In previous sections we have seen the usefulness of accuracy func-
tion to inspect queries’ error, reason about the trade-os of privacy and
accuracy, among other perks. It is clear then that providing theoretical
bounds over the errors of the implemented queries becomes handy to
ease and assist data analysts’ tasks. However, one might argue that hav-
ing a theoretical bound is as important as producing a measurement of
the tightness of such calculations. In this section, we focus on the veri-
cation of how close DPella’s accuracy calculations are to the real error
bounds.
Thanks to DPella’s data independence, we have been able to create
the primitive empiric that allows analysts to compare the theoretical
bound (provided by accuracy) against an empirical one. It oers a
quantication of how tight are DPella’s estimations for a query while
still preserving the privacy of the data subjects. The primitive empiric
is a follows:
empiric :: (→ Data 1 r→ Query (Value a))→ Iter
→ → β → IO β
Given a query plan (of type  → Data 1 r → Query (Value a)),
a number of iterations (where Iter is isomorphic to the type Int), a
xed privacy loss  and condence βth; primitive empiric will return
the empirical condence βemp of the given query using the theoretical
error provided by accuracy with βth.
Ideally, βemp should be signicantly close to βth. In particular, since
accuracy yields an upper bound of the error, when empiric is run
multiple times we expect βemp to be less or equal than βth most of the
time. The unsatisability of this condition indicates that the probability
of being above the theoretic error is higher than anticipated, from which
we can deduce that DPella’s error estimation is unsound and it does not
48
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
Dimension (dim)
βth
βemp 1K iter
βemp 10K iter
Figure 20: Results of empiric over 3-way marginals
actually yield an upper bound of the query’s accuracy. On the other hand,
if for most of the runs we observe that βemp  βth, we can infer that
DPella’s estimations are loose, indicating that we could either increase
the condence or decrease the error.
The procedure followed by empiric is fairly simple. Firstly, it exe-
cutes the given query as many times as indicated over an empty dataset,
this process clearly does not involve any sensitive information. However,
the attentive reader might have noticed that these executions will allow
us to inspect query’s noise since they will only return the perturbation
to be added, this is, we are sampling as many times as iterations from the
Laplace distribution (or Gauss, depending on the mechanism) scaled by
the sensitivity of the query under consideration. From the samples we
obtain the empirical errors. Secondly, it computes the theoretical error
αth using primitive accuracy with condence βth. Lastly, it computes
βemp as the percentage of empirical errors that are above the theoreti-
cal one. Formally, let αiemp be the i-th empirical error and xi be a binary
variable describing if αiemp > αth, then we can calculate βemp as follow.
βemp =
∑iter
i=1 xi
iter
In other words, βemp describes the likelihood that the empirical error
αemp is grater than the theoretical one αth, provided by DPella.
To illustrate how empiric could be used by an analyst, recall the
example of the 3-way marginal discussed in the previous section (see
Section 4.3). Previously, we claimed that the empirical error of func-
tion threeMarginal from Figure 18 is well aligned with the theoreti-
cal one provided by DPella. This statement can be now veried using
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empiric primitive. For localEps = 0.1 and dim ranging from 3 to 20,
Figure 20 shows the results of calculating the empirical condence of
threeMarginal with βth set to 0.05 and iterating 1000 and 10000 times.
From these results we can conclude that increasing the number of it-
erations will stabilize the results, making the anlayses easier, and that,
the empirical error provided for DPella for function threeMarginal is
indeed very close tho the empirical error bound. Moreover, it depicts
DPella’s soundness, since in both cases (for 1K and 10K iterations), most
of the βemp where below βth’s line.
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Limitations & Extensions
We have discussed so far the use of DPella as an API allowing a
programmer to implement her own data analyses. However, we foreseen
DPella to also serve as a "glue" which enables a programmer to integrate
arbitrary DP-algorithms, as (black-box) building blocks while reasoning
about accuracy. In this light, our design supports the introduction of
new primitives when some analyses cannot be directly implemented
because either (i) the static analysis for accuracy provided by DPella is
too conservative, or (ii) DPella’s API building blocks are not enough to
express the desired analysis. Below, we describe several possible such
extensions.
The matrix mechanism (MM)
As we discussed in the previous section, in some situations DPella allows
to answer in an accurate way multiple counting queries in a way that is
similar to the MM. As an example, DPella estimates accuracy better then
MM for the strategy I—recall Section 4. However, for other workloads
and other strategies the accuracy provided by DPella is too conservative.
To consider other workloads and strategies, the MM can be incorporated
into DPella as a primitive for answering counting queries. The require-
ments for this are that the return values are tainted, and that we have
an iCDFs for it—this can be calculated as in [24]. In general, it is sound
to add new primitives which permit a more precise accuracy analysis
as long as the return values are tainted, and an accuracy information
is provided—thus eectively allowing to further compose the primitive
with other analyses by means of the union bound.
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Primitives with non-compositional privacy anal-
yses
Several DP-algorithms have a privacy analysis which does not follow
directly by composition. Some well-known examples are report-noisy-
max, the exponential mechanism, and the sparse-vector technique—see
[15] and [7] for more details. In their natural implementations, these
algorithms branch on the result of some noised query’s result, and the
privacy analyses use some properties of the noise distributions that are
not directly expressible in terms of composition of dierentially private
components. Because DPella’s API does not allow to branch on the
results of noised queries, and because the privacy analyses that DPella
support are based on composition, we cannot implement these analyses
directly using the DPella API. However, we can provide them as (black-
box) primitives. We already discussed how to integrate report-noisy-max
through a primitive dpMax (Figure 4). The exponential mechanism (EM)
can be incorporated into DPella in a similar way. One subtleties that one
has to consider is the fact that the privacy guarantee of EM depends on a
bound of the sensitivity of the score function. We handle this by requiring
the score function’s output to be bound between 0 and 1, bounding the
sensitivity to be at most 1. As with dpMax, the output of EM is tainted. The
EM is an important mechanism which allows to implement many other
techniques. In particular, we can use EM to implement the oine version
of the sparse vector technique, as discussed in [15]. These components
allow DPella to support automated reasoning about accuracy for complex
algorithms such as the oine version of the MWEM algorithm [27]
following an analysis similar to the one discussed in [8].
Online adaptive algorithms
Several DP-algorithms have dierent implementations depending if they
work oine—where all the decision are taken upfront before running
the program—or online—where some of the decision are taken while
running the program. Online algorithms usually have a more involved
control ow which depend on information that are available at runtime.
As an example, the online version of the sparse vector technique uses the
result of a DP query to decide whether to stop or not the computation
(or whether to stop or not giving meaningful answers). These kind of
algorithms usually are based on some re-use of a noised result which
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correspond to a taint value in DPella. So, the current design of DPella
cannot support them. We plan to explore as future how to integrate
these algorithms in DPella.
Improving accuracy through post-processing
Several works have explored the use of post-processing techniques to
improve on accuracy, e.g. [28, 26, 45]. Most of these works use accuracy
measure that dier from the one we consider here, and use some specic
properties of the particular problem at hand. As an example, the work
by Hay et al. [28] describes how to boost accuracy in terms of Mean
Squared Error (MSE) for DP hierarchical queries by post-processing
the DP results by means of some relatively simple optimization. This
improvement in accuracy relies among other things on the impact that
the optimization has on the MSE, which does not directly apply to the
α-β notion of accuracy we use here. We expect that, also for the notion
of α-β accuracy we use, it is possible to use post-processing for improve
accuracy. However, we leave this for future works. Moreover, the reason
for us to chose α-β accuracy as the principal notion of accuracy in
DPella is because of its compositional nature expressible through the
use of probability bounds. It is an interesting future direction to design
a similar compositional theory also for other accuracy notions such as
MSE. We expect DPella to be extensible to incorporate such a theory,
once it is available.
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Programming frameworks for DP
PINQ [38] uses dynamic tracking and sensitivity information to guaran-
tee privacy of computations. Among the frameworks and tools sharing
features with PINQ we highlight: Airavat [49] ; wPINQ [47]; DJoin [43];
Ektelo [60]; Flex [30]; and PrivateSQL [32]. In contrast to DPella, none of
these works keeps track of accuracy, nor static analysis for privacy or ac-
curacy. As discussed in Section 2, DPella supports a limited form of joins,
and it is still able to provide accuracy estimates. We leave as future work
to support more general join operations through techniques similar to the
ones proposed in Flex and PrivateSQL. While several of the components
from the frameworks discussed above are not supported in the current
implementation of DPella, these can be added as black-box primitives, as
we discussed in Section 6. All the programming frameworks discussed
above support reasoning about privacy for complex data analyses while
neglecting accuracy, whereas DPella supports accuracy, but restricts the
programming framework to rule out certain analysis (e.g., adaptive ones)
for which we do not have a general compositional theory, yet.
Tools for DP
In a way similar to DPella, there exist tools which support reasoning
about accuracy and restrict the kind of data analyses they support.
GUPT [42] is a tool based on the sample-and-aggregate framework for
dierential privacy [46]. GUPT allows analysts to specify the target accu-
racy of the output, and compute privacy from it—or vice versa. This ap-
proach has inspired several of the subsequent works and also our design.
The limitations of GUPT are that it supports only analyses that t in the
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sample-and-aggregate framework, and it supports only condence inter-
vals estimates expressed at the level of individual queries. In contrast,
DPella supports analyses of a more general class, such as the ones we dis-
cussed in Section 1 and Section 4, and it also allows to reason about the
accuracy of combined queries, rather that just about the individual ones.
PSI [23] oers to the data analyst an interface for selecting either the level
of accuracy that she wants to reach, or the level of privacy she wants to
impose. The error estimates that PSI provides are similar to the ones that
are supported in DPella. However, similarly to GUPT, PSI supports only
a limited set of transformations and primitives, it supports only con-
dence intervals at the level of individual queries, and in its current form
it does not allow analysts to submit their own (programmed) queries.
APEx [24] has similar goals as DPella and it allows data analysts to
write queries as SQL-like statements. However, the model that APEx uses
is dierent from DPella’s. It supports three kind of queries: WCQ (count-
ing queries), ICQ (iceberg counting queries), and TCQ (top-k counting
queries). To answer WCQ queries, APEx uses the matrix mechanism (re-
call Section 4) and applies a Monte Carlo simulations to achieve accuracy
bounds in terms of α and β, and to determine the least privacy parame-
ter () that ts those bounds. We have shown how DPella can be used to
answer queries based on the identity strategies using partition and con-
centration bounds. To answer eectively dierent workloads and strate-
gies as well as ICQ and TCQ queries, we would need to extend DPella
with the matrix mechanism as a black-box (recall Section 6). While APEx
supports advanced query strategies, it does not provide means to rea-
son about combinations of analyses, e.g., it does not support reasoning
about the accuracy of a query using results from WCQs queries to per-
form TCQs ones. DPella instead has been designed specically to sup-
port the combination of dierent queries. As we discussed in Section 6,
DPella can be seen as a programming environment that could be com-
bined with some of the analyses supported by tools similar to PSI, GUPT
or APEx in order to reason about the accuracy of the combined queries.
Formal Calculi for DP
There are several works on enforcing dierential privacy relying on
dierent models and techniques. Within this group are Fuzz [48]—a
programming language which enforces (pure) dierential privacy of
computations using a linear type system which keeps track of program
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sensitivity—and its derivatives DFuzz [21], Adaptive Fuzz [58], Fuzzi [62],
and Duet [44]. Hoare2 [4], a programming language which enforces (pure
or approximate) dierential privacy using program verication, together
with its extension PrivInfer [5] supporting dierentially private Bayesian
programming; and other systems using similar ideas [7, 1, 61, 57].
Barthe et al. [3] devise a method for proving dierential privacy using
Hoare logic. Their method uses accuracy bounds for the Laplace Mecha-
nism for proving privacy bounds of the Propose-Test-Release Mechanism,
but cannot be used to prove accuracy bounds of arbitrary computations.
Later, Barthe et al. [8] develop a Hoare-style logic, named aHL, internal-
izing the use of the union bound for reasoning about probabilistic im-
perative programs. The authors show how to use aHL for reasoning in a
mechanized way about accuracy bounds of several basic techniques such
as report-noisy-max, sparse vector and MWEM. This work has largely in-
spired our design of DPella but with several dierences. First, aHL mixes
the reasoning about accuracy with the more classical Hoare-style rea-
soning. This choice makes aHL very expressive but dicult to automate.
DPella instead favors automation over expressivity. As discussed before,
the use of DPella to derive accuracy bound is transparent to a program-
mer thanks to its automation. On the other hand, there are mechanisms
that can be analyzed using aHL and cannot be analyzed using DPella, e.g.
adaptive online algorithms. Second, aHL supports only reasoning about
accuracy but it does not support reasoning about privacy. This makes
it dicult to use aHL for reasoning about the privacy-accuracy trade-
os. Finally, aHL supports only reasoning using the union bound and it
does not support reasoning based on the Cherno bound. This makes
DPella more precise on the algorithms that can be analyzed using the
Cherno Bound. Barthe et al [6] use aHL, in combination with a logic
supporting reasoning by coupling, to verify dierentially private algo-
rithms whose privacy guarantee depends on the accuracy guarantee of
some sub-component. We leave exploring this direction for future works.
More recently, Smith et al. [54] propose an automated approach for com-
puting accuracy bounds of probabilistic imperative programs. This work
shares some similarities with our. However, it does not support reason-
ing about privacy, and it only uses the Union Bound and do not attempt
to reason about probabilistic independence to obtain tighter bounds.
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Other works
In a recent work, Ligett et al. [35] propose a framework for developing
dierentially private algorithms under accuracy constraints. This allows
one to chose a given level of accuracy rst, and then nding the private
algorithm meeting this accuracy. This framework is so far limited to
empirical risk minimization problems and it is not supported by a system,
yet.
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Conclusions
DPella is a programming framework for reasoning about privacy,
accuracy, and their trade-os. DPella uses taint analysis to detect proba-
bilistic independence and derive tighter accuracy bounds using Cher-
no bounds. We believe the principles behind DPella, i.e., the use of con-
centration bounds guided by taint analysis, could generalize for more
notions of privacy such as Renyi-DP [40], concentrated dierential pri-
vacy [16], zero concentrated dierential privacy [10], or truncated con-
centrated dierential privacy [11] (as done with (, δ)-DP). As future
work, we envision lifting the restriction that programs should not branch
on query outputs.
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